We use a novel experimental design to distinguish strategic from non-strategic motives for cooperation in social dilemmas. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we can differentiate between end-game and non-end-game behavior within individuals. This allows us to determine to what extent both non-strategically and strategically cooperating individuals are responsible for so-called end-game effects. Individuals who cooperate non-strategically do not change their behavior depending on whether the game continues or not. In contrast, strategically-motivated individuals cooperate only if the game continues and otherwise defect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in a repeated game is indeed strategic.
Introduction
A pattern commonly observed in finitely repeated-game experiments, and particularly sharp when only two players are involved, is that cooperation starts at a high level and declines towards the end of the game (see Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Keser and van Winden, 2000) . One explanation is that strategically motivated individuals, who cooperate solely because there is future interaction, do not have an incentive to do so in the final period of a game. 1 However, the reduced incentive to cooperate is also present for individuals who react reciprocally to what they believe others will do, at least if they believe others will stop cooperating in the last period(s). 2 Consequently, given that both strategically and non-strategically motivated individuals react similarly in these situations, it is difficult to distinguish between the two motivations. Indeed, in typical repeated-game experiments, given that many individuals cooperate less or stop cooperating in the final period(s), one cannot know whether an individual stops cooperating per se or because he/she believes that the partner stops cooperating. Clearly, his problem cannot be easily resolved by eliciting beliefs as it is only on rare occasions that the two types of individuals are expected to exhibit different belief-action combinations. 3 In this paper, we report results from experiments designed in order to solve this identification problem. Our design allows us to observe the choice of an individual in the continuation game and, at the same time, in the end game. Moreover, unlike in previous repeated-game experiments, we observe counterfactual behavior in the last period: we know whether an individual continues or stops cooperating in the last period when it is certain that the partner will continue cooperating.
Identifying the extent to which cooperation in repeated games is due to strategic or non-strategic motivations is important because it can help us understand the types of policies and institutions that can mitigate free riding.
That strategic motivations drive, at least in part, behavior is suggested by experiments showing that individuals are typically more cooperative in repeated games than in (repetitions of) one-shot games. 4 Moreover, the frequency of cooperative behavior also seems to increase with 1 See Kreps et al. (1982) , for a model that rationalizes the observed pattern by assuming incomplete information.
2 Reciprocity irrespective of future interaction, is often referred to as strong reciprocity (see Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002) . 3 The experiments of Croson (2000) and Gächter and Renner (2006) , e.g., show that, overall, the observed pattern of beliefs closely resembles the observed pattern of actions. 4 See the difference in cooperation between so-called partner matching and random matching treatments in, for example, bribery games (Abbink, 2004) , principal-agent games (Cochard and Willinger, 2005) , trust games the probability of future interaction and the profitability of cooperation (e.g., Dal Bó, 2005) . On the other hand, given that individuals are willing to cooperate even in one-shot games, nonstrategic motivations or social preferences might play a role in games with repeated interaction as well. 5
In our experiment, subjects play a repeated prisoners' dilemma game-strategically equivalent to the sequential prisoners' dilemma-with a probability of continuation. That is, we use the contingent response method developed by Selten (1967) to allow a first type of players (cf. first movers) to condition their decision on whether the period they are playing is or is not the final period of the game. The second type of players (cf. second movers) is allowed to condition their decision on: (i) whether the period they are playing is or is not the final period of the game, and
(ii) whether the first mover cooperates or defects. Eliciting the second movers' strategy for the stage game, conditioned on whether there is future interaction or not, gives us strong insights on the motivations behind cooperation in repeated games. 6 Moreover, it allows us to determine to what extent both non-strategically and strategically cooperating individuals are responsible for the pattern observed in (finitely) repeated-game experiments.
Our design has the advantage that second movers face no uncertainty with respect to the first mover's behavior. Therefore, irrespective of their expectations, second movers who are willing to cooperate when they know they are playing the last period of the game must be motivated (at least in part) by non-strategic considerations. In contrast, second movers who always defect when they know it is the last period, but who are willing to cooperate when they know it is not, are clearly cooperating for strategic reasons. 7 Our design also has the advantage that it clearly isolates the end-game effect. In games with a finite number of periods, differing abilities (Huck et al., 2006) , conflict games (Lacomba et al., 2008) , prisoners' dilemma games (Duffy and Ochs, 2008) , giftexchange games (Gächter and Falk, 2002) and public good games (Croson, 1996; Keser and van Winden, 2000) . Andreoni (e.g., 1988) , in fact, finds more cooperation under random matching than under partner matching (for an explanation of these mixed results see Andreoni and Croson, 2003) .
5 See Dawes and Thaler (1988) for an overview of the evidence and for additional evidence and a theoretical model of such preferences.
6 To facilitate reading, we will often refer to these conditional stage-game strategies simply as strategies. Also note that we do not elicit the actual strategies for the whole game as doing so could require an infinite number of questions.
7 As in other experiments, expectations do play a role in the behavior of first movers. Consequently, we cannot fully identify their motivations for cooperation. For this reason, we concentrate most of our analysis on the second movers.
to perform backward induction (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Katok et al., 2002) can distribute the end-game effect over the last few periods. In our experiment, cooperation in non-final and final periods are clearly differentiated.
There are other studies that investigate behavior in the sequential prisoner's dilemma (see Brandts and Charness, 2000; Cason and Mui, 2001 ) and/or examine motivations for cooperation by eliciting strategies (see Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006) . However, they use one-shot settings, and it is not clear whether behavior in a one-shot game is the same as behavior in the last period of a repeated game. 8 Furthermore, they do not have information about continuation-and end-game strategies within individuals.
There are also experiments that use the subjects' behavior to infer their repeated-game strategies Slonim, 2004, 2006) . These studies find that subjects use strategies that produce end-game effects in finitely-repeated games and punishment of free riders that resemble grim-trigger strategies in infinitely-repeated games. However, since both of these results can be due to both strategic and non-strategic motives, these papers cannot differentiate between the two motivations.
The study which comes closest to our paper is Muller et al. (2008) , where subjects play a two-period linear public good game and submit a strategy for the whole two periods. Our design improves on theirs for the purpose of identifying strategically-motivated cooperation in the form of trigger strategies. In their design, subjects play in groups of three players, they make a fairly continuous contribution decision, their information is limited to the group's aggregate behavior, and their choices are conditioned only on average contributions, which makes trigger strategies hard to implement and identify.
On the basis of three treatments, with two different subject pools, we find that most of the observed pattern in cooperation is strategically motivated. Additionally, non-strategic motivations are more important, the higher the profitability of cooperation. Furthermore, with the use of two control treatments we find that applying contingent responses does not affect the second movers' behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the game and methodology used in the experiments. In Section 3 we describe the experimental design and procedures in detail.
We present the results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
The game implemented in the experiment is a strategic equivalent of the sequential prisoners' dilemma with two players and is repeated with a probability of continuation equal to δ. In the stage game, a first mover i = 1, and a second mover i = 2, choose between cooperating C i , or defecting D i . If both players cooperate they both get π C , if both defect they both get π D , and if one defects and the other cooperates the defector gets the temptation payoff π T and the cooperator gets the sucker payoff π S . As in all prisoners' dilemma games, payoffs are such that defecting is the dominant strategy: π T > π C > π D > π S , and mutual cooperation is the efficient
By making their decision using contingent responses, players can condition their choice on whether the game will continue or end. In each period t a number x t is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1] . If x t ≤ δ then t is not the final period of the game and the game continues. If x t > δ then the game ends as soon as period t is played. Both first movers and second movers submit an action depending on whether x t ≤ δ or x t > δ. In addition, second movers submit an action also depending on whether the first mover cooperates or defects. Thus, whereas first movers submit an action in two cases: (i) x t ≤ δ and (ii) x t > δ, second movers submit an action in four cases: (i) C 1 and x t ≤ δ, (ii) D 1 and x t ≤ δ, (iii) C 1 and x t > δ, and (iv) D 1 and x t > δ. After both players submit their decisions, they learn the realization of x t , the corresponding action of the other player, and their payoff. 9
As is well known, full cooperation in repeated games with an unknown end can be achieved by rational own-payoff maximizing individuals with the use of trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971 ).
In fact, for a sufficiently high δ, any profile of play can be sustained as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium (Rubinstein, 1979; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) . In our game, mutual cooperation by rational own-payoff maximizers is supported if the continuation probability falls above the
. 10 This follows from the fact that both players always defect when they play the final period of the game (i.e., when x t > δ), which makes the game in non-final periods (i.e., when x t ≤ δ) equivalent to a game with an unknown end. 11 In this 9 Note that players are only informed of the other player's action for the actual realization of x t . Thus if x t ≤ δ, the second mover learns whether the first mover chose C1 or D1 when the game continues but does not learn the first mover's choice if t had been the last period of the game.
10 Note that we are assuming no time discounting in the experiment, which we think is reasonable since the time interval between periods is very short and subjects are not paid until the end.
11 A general worry with playing games with an unknown end is that subjects know the experiment cannot last case, mutual cooperation can be sustained by a trigger strategy only if δ ≥ δ * in which case the second mover gets a higher payoff by cooperating than by defecting. 12 We use a setting in which mutual cooperation is not an equilibrium if it is common knowledge that all players are rational own-payoff maximizers. That is, we set the probability of continuation and the payoffs of the stage game such that δ < δ * in all our treatments. 13 This reduces the motivations to strategically cooperate to subjects who believe others have a preference for mutual cooperation, such as in finitely-repeated games with partners matching.
As previously mentioned, our design allows us to observe the strategies used by second movers.
There are two strategies that are of special interest. The first one consists of conditionally cooperating with the first mover irrespective of whether they are playing the last period or not. We refer to this strategy as strong reciprocity, that is, reciprocity irrespective of potential future interaction (Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002) . The second one corresponds to conditionally cooperating as long as the last period is not being played and defecting if it is. We refer to this strategy as reputation building as it is a clear example of strategically-motivated cooperation.
These and other important strategies are described in Table 1 . For example, it is also informative to know the prevalence of second movers who choose the strategy of unconditional defection. We should note, however, that we cannot differentiate between second movers who are strategic but defect because they play a defection equilibrium and second movers who defect for non-strategic reasons.
for an extremely long time. Thus, they might discount future interactions at a rate that is lower than δ. However, for the purpose of our experiment, this can at most induce a very small decrease in the frequency of strategically motivated cooperation (subjects who are not strategically motivated and those who are already unconditionally defecting are not affected by more discounting).
12 A first mover does not have an incentive to deviate from an equilibrium with mutual cooperation since, given that a second mover would imitate defection, he can never attain the high temptation payoff.
13 One can expect some degree of unilateral cooperation if subjects play a correlated equilibrium and δ ≥ Stahl, 1991) . However, these equilibria require a high degree of coordination which is hard to achieve in the laboratory. We report whether there is evidence for these type of strategies in footnote 19.
Alternatively, mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium if there is a fraction of first and/or second movers who (are believed to) play according to a tit-for-tat strategy (see Kreps et al., 1982) . We discuss this possibility in the conclusions. 
Experimental design and procedures
We ran two experiments, each with a different subject pool. Both experiments were conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted about 45 minutes. Subjects were recruited through online recruitment systems. In total, 312 subjects participated in the experiments. Each subject played only once. After their arrival, subjects drew a card to be randomly assigned to a seat in the laboratory, and consequently to a role and a treatment. Once everyone was seated, subjects were given the instructions for the experiment. The instructions are written with neutral language. Thereafter, roles were revealed and subjects had to answer a few control questions to corroborate their understanding of the game. Next, they played the game until the random draw indicated that it ended. Roles and pairs were kept constant throughout the experiment giving us one independent observation per second mover. Once the game finished, subjects answered a debriefing questionnaire after which they were paid in cash and dismissed. Average earnings in the experiment I were e9.38 and $11.20 in experiment II. 14 An overview of the treatment parameters in both experiments is given in Table A1 .
Experiment I
The first experiment was run in CentERlab at Tilburg University. It consisted of one treatment where we implemented the game described above, which we refer to as Tilburg, and two control treatments. In all cases, we chose a continuation probability of δ = 0.60 and the payoffs of the stage game were selected so that δ * = 0.61. The value of x t was generated by the computer, and in order to keep the three treatments as comparable as possible, the random sequence of each pair in Tilburg was used in one pair in each control treatment. The average number of periods played equaled 2.73. The purpose of Tilburg is to identify the various strategies used by second movers, while the purpose of the control treatments is to test the validity of the contingent response method.
In principle, it is possible that the use of the contingent response method induces a change in behavior. In the experimental literature there is yet no consensus if this is indeed the case.
Various authors report no significant differences in, for example, sequential dictator games (Cason and Mui, 1998) , and, closest to our study, chicken and prisoners' dilemma games (Brandts and Charness, 2000) . However, there are also studies that do find differences in behavior. For instance, some authors have found less punishment with the use of contingent responses than without it (Brosig et al., 2003; Falk et al., 2005) . For this reason, we use two control treatments to test whether the method affects behavior in our setting. In the first control treatment, Control I, subjects play the same game of Tilburg except that they no longer submit a decision for both final and non-final periods. In other words, subjects are first told whether x t ≤ δ or x t > δ and then they make their decision. Note that second movers still submit separate choices depending on whether the first mover cooperates or not. By comparing choices between this control and Tilburg we can test whether behavior is affected by conditioning decisions on whether it is the last period or not. In the second control, Control II, we again implement the same game but this time without the use of contingent responses. In other words, subjects are told whether x t ≤ δ or x t > δ before they decide and second movers learn what the first mover did before they make their choice. By comparing behavior between the two control treatments we can test whether the decisions of second movers are affected by the possibility to condition their choice on whether the first mover cooperated or defected.
Experiment II
In the second experiment, we implemented the game with the full use of contingent responses but this time we varied the value of δ * between treatments. We used a coin toss to determine whether the game continued or ended. In other words, the continuation probability is equal to δ = 0.50.
These treatments were run for two reasons. The first is that it is interesting to see how the elicited strategies change as one varies the benefit of cooperation. It is well established that subjects are more willing to cooperate in non-strategic settings if it is more profitable to do so (e.g., Goeree et al., 2002) . The second reason is that, although the evidence is mixed, there is some worry that the use of economics and business students biases results in experiments involving cooperative behavior (e.g., Marwell and Ames, 1981; Engelmann and Strobel, 2006; more frequent in Northwestern High vis-à-vis Northwestern Low (p = 0.025). The same is true, albeit weakly, for the overall cooperation rate (p = 0.054). This finding confirms our expectation that the occurrence of cooperation is sensitive to its profitability.
Next, we proceed to the paper's main results. In subsection 4.1, we provide an overview of the subjects' strategies, where most of our attention goes to second movers' strategies. In subsection 4.2, we turn to the causes of the end-game effect.
First and second movers' strategies
To begin, our results show that a large fraction of first movers who cooperate do so only in non-final periods. In other words, their stage-game strategy consists of cooperating if it is not the last period and defecting otherwise. In Tilburg, 75% of first movers who cooperate submit this strategy, in Northwestern High it is 59% and in Northwestern Low 46%. 17 This is interesting as first movers have an incentive to defect in the last period only if they anticipate that a large fraction of second movers are cooperating strategically.
Next, with respect to second movers, our results show that, in line with the existing literature, cooperation is almost exclusively conditional: they are much more likely to cooperate when the first mover cooperates than when the first mover defects. In Tilburg, if the first mover cooperates, the rate at which second movers cooperate is 0.366, and if he defects, it is 0.084. In Northwestern High, the respective rates are 0.570 and 0.074, and in Northwestern Low 0.206 and 0.015. In all treatments the difference in cooperation rates is statistically significant. 18 In the remainder of this subsection we use the second movers' strategies to disentangle their motivations for cooperation. Figure 1 presents the distribution of second movers' strategies in Tilburg and the two Northwestern treatments using the classification of Table 1 . Overall, unconditional defection is the most common strategy. It is chosen from 28% to 60% of the time. However, there is still considerable space for strategies that involve some cooperation.
In all treatments, the most frequent strategy that includes some cooperation is reputation building. It accounts for around 30% of all strategies. This is even the case in Northwestern Low where the continuation probability is well below the threshold required for mutual cooperation to be sustainable as an equilibrium under common knowledge of rationality. The third most com- mon strategy is strong reciprocity, whose frequency varies between 6% and 23%. Unconditional cooperation is used less than 5% of the time and other strategies between 2% and 14%. 19
In Figure 1 one can also see a noticeable change in the frequency of strategies across the two Northwestern treatments (the distributions are significantly different, p = 0.043). This reveals that the observed decrease in cooperation rates in Northwestern Low vis-à-vis Northwestern High is driven by a sharp increase in the frequency of unconditional defection at the expense of strong reciprocity, unconditional cooperation, and strategies under 'other'. Interestingly, the frequency of reputation building is almost identical.
Next we turn to the relative importance of the various strategies in explaining the conditional pattern with which second movers cooperate. To do so, we look at the second movers' realized 19 Two strategies account for around 70% of those in the 'other' category. The first is always defecting if it is not the last period and conditionally cooperating if it is. The second is always cooperating if it is not the last period and conditionally cooperating if it is. Note that, we don't find support for cooperation due to correlated equilibria (Stahl, 1991) -perhaps due to the lack of a suitable coordination device. In these equilibria, we ought to observe some second movers choosing the strategy: D 2 if C 1 and x t ≤ δ, C 2 if D 1 and x t ≤ δ, and D 2 whenever x t > δ. This strategy was chosen only once by one subject.
stage-game strategies-that is, the strategies we would observe if subjects could condition their choice on the action of the first mover but could not condition on whether it was the last period or not. We observe that the 'conditional cooperation' stage-game strategy accounts for most cooperative actions: 76% in Tilburg, 86% in Northwestern High, and 92% in Northwestern
Low. Now, if we look at the strategies that are behind the 'conditional cooperation' stage-game strategy we see that reputation building is again the most common. In Tilburg, reputation building produces 64% of all conditional cooperation, in Northwestern High it produces 48%, and in Northwestern Low 64%. The respective percentages for strong reciprocity are 12%, 44%, and 36%. 20
Finally, we find that strategies are fairly stable both across periods and within subjects. A majority of subjects consistently chose one of the strategies in Table 1 , while other strategies are chosen less consistently. 21 Moreover, we also find that the contingent response or strategy method is a valid technique, for our purpose, since it does not induce different behavior compared to 'hot' decision-making. 22
Disentangling end-game effects
We should first note that, looking at realized mutual cooperation in final periods and nonfinal periods, a clear end-game effect is observed. 23 The realized rates of mutual cooperation depending on whether it is the last period or not are 0.363 and 0.033 in Tilburg, 0.194 and 0.094
in Northwestern High, and 0.064 and 0.000 in Northwestern Low (p < 0.001).
In Figure 2 , we show the rate of mutual cooperation in each period t ∈ {1, 2, 3+} 24 using first 20 Reputation building is also the most common reason for second-movers' realized cooperation. 23 All results in this subsection also hold if we concentrate on the second movers' cooperation rates. indicates there is already a clear difference in behavior between the two situations before subjects have the opportunity to interact (as in Keser and van Winden, 2000) . 27
In Table 2 , we show summary statistics on the drop in mutual cooperation in non-final and final periods, again using the subjects' strategies. As can be seen, this drop is significantly different from zero in the three treatments. The main aim of Table 2 , however, is to show the results of an exercise where we isolate the effects of first movers' expectations and of second 25 See Table 2 .
26 Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of differences between non-final-and final-period mutual cooperation strategies yield p < 0.083 in t = 1. 27 We do not find evidence that rates of mutual cooperation follow time trends for any of the treatments, nor for final or non-final periods. In all treatments, Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between cooperation rates and periods are not significantly different from zero (p > 0.204). Note: The table shows, for each treatment, the mean change in mutual cooperation rates from non-final to final periods calculated based on first and second movers' strategies. It also shows the mean drop in the case that first movers would make their continuation choice, and in the case that second movers would keep their continuation strategy. ***, **, and * indicate whether the drop is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, according to Wilcoxon-signed-ranks tests based on independent observations.
Tilburg Northwestern High Northwestern Low
Given continuation strategy of second movers). Table 2 shows that removing strategic behavior of second movers has unambiguous effects: it removes the (significance of the) end-game effect in the three treatments. Indeed, in neither of the cases is the drop or change in mutual cooperation significantly different from zero when second movers would use their continuation strategy instead of their end strategy. Moreover, changing first movers' end choices into their continuation choices does not remove the end-game effect in Tilburg and in Northwestern Low : due to second movers behaving strategically, the drop in mutual cooperation is still significantly different from zero in these treatments. In Northwestern High, however, the end-game effect is no longer statistically significant when first movers' end choices are replaced by their continuation choices.
All in all, although end-game effects seem to be predominantly driven by strategic motivations of second movers, correctly anticipated by first movers, the results reveal that first movers' expectations might be important as well. Indeed, the extent to which first movers' expectations of reputation building can give rise to end-game effects seems to depend on the profitability of cooperation (and possibly the subject pool). When the profitability of cooperation is high, and mutual cooperation thus generates large efficiency gains, the share of strongly reciprocating second movers increases, which does not seem to be fully anticipated by first movers. However, it might be the case that, when the repeated game is repeated several times giving first movers an opportunity to learn (as in Selten and Stoecker, 1986) , the correspondence between their beliefs and the distribution of second movers' strategies will improve.
Conclusions
In this paper we provide evidence of the relative importance of strategically-motivated versus non-strategically-motivated cooperation in social dilemmas. We report the results of a laboratory experiment where subjects play a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a probabilistic end.
The novelty of our design is that choices can be conditioned on whether the period of play is the final period or not, which allows us to separate strategic from non-strategic motivations for cooperation.
We find that second movers use a reputation building strategy around 30% of the time, which accounts for between 32% and 67% of all realized cooperative actions. We also find that the frequency of reputation building is largely unaffected by changes in the profitability of cooperation and the subject pool. The other two commonly-used strategies are unconditional defection (used between 28% and 60% of the time) and strong reciprocity (between 6% and 23%).
The latter accounts for between 0% and 29% of cooperative actions. We find the distribution of strategies to be fairly stable in time and within subjects. Moreover, we find that using contingent responses to elicit strategies does not affect behavior compared to the direct-response method.
Furthermore, our results show that removing strategic behavior of second movers by replacing their end-game with their continuation-game strategy largely removes observed end-game effects.
However, when the profitability of cooperation is relatively high, and strong reciprocity among second movers thus relatively common, first movers' expectations might also have a bearing an end-game effects.
We should also note that the relatively large share of reputation building observed in the experiment is roughly consistent with the model of Kreps et al. (1982) , in which rational own-payoff maximizing individuals cooperate due to the existence of tit-for-tat players (strong reciprocators in our game). Unfortunately, the precise amount of reputation building predicted by the model is hard to corroborate empirically as it involves the use of mixed strategies, which are hard to observe when eliciting only stage-game strategies (see the discussion in Palacios-Huerta and
Volij, 2008). 28
Lastly, we see an increase in the cooperation rate as the payoff of mutual cooperation increases. The change is mainly due to an increase in the share of strong reciprocators, say β 2 . This is consistent with the idea that social preferences as strong reciprocity react to changes in financial incentives (see, e.g., Goeree et al., 2002; . For the remaining share of second movers, 1 − β 2 , the increase in mutual cooperation payoff decreases the weight of the 'always defect' strategy (from 67% to 36%) and increases the weight of reputation building (from 30% to 40%). This is consistent with Kreps et al. (1982) since an increase in the share of strongly reciprocating second movers, if anticipated by first movers, makes reputation building more profitable for the remaining (rational) second movers and thus more likely as opposed to the 'always defect' strategy.
A Appendix
A.1 Overview of experiments and treatments model see Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Andreoni and Miller (1993) .
A.2 Instructions
These are the instructions for the Northwestern High treatment. The instructions for other treatments are very similar and available from the authors upon request.
General
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make a number of decisions. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn money. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and one of us will help you.
During the experiment your earnings will be expressed in points. Points will be converted to US dollars at the following rate: 10 points = $2.00.
The experiment is strictly anonymous: that is, your identity will not be revealed to others and the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
In the experiment, participants will be randomly divided into groups of 2 participants. You will therefore be in a group with one other participant. The composition of the groups will remain the same during the entire experiment.
In each group, one participant will be randomly assigned to the first mover position. The other participant in the group will be in the second mover position. Your position as first or second mover will remain the same during the entire experiment.
Your decision in each period
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period, both the first and the second mover make a choice between option A and option B. The first mover makes his/her decision first. Thereafter the second mover makes his/her decision. 
Number of Periods
For each group, the number of periods of in the experiment is determined randomly. At the end of each period, we will throw a coin to determine whether that period was the last period of the experiment or whether the experiment continues (heads means the experiment continues and tails means the experiment ends). Thus, in every period the probability that the experiment continues is 50% and the probability that the experiment ends is 50%. Your total earnings in the experiment will equal the sum of earnings across all periods.
After each period, you will receive feedback concerning the decision of the other participant in your group and on your earnings.
The decision of the first mover
In each period, the first mover makes his/her decision in each of the two following situations:
• Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the final period (in other words the experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• Do you choose A or B if the current period is the final period (in other words the experiment does not proceed)?
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues (heads), then earnings in that period will depend on the answer to the first question. If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment ends (tails), then earnings depend on the answer to the second question.
The decision of the second mover
In each period, the second mover makes his/her decision in each of the four following situations:
• If the first mover chooses A: Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the final period (in other words the experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• If the first mover chooses A: Do you choose A or B if the current period is the final period (in other words the experiment does not proceed)?
• If the first mover chooses B: Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the final period (in other words the experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• If the first mover chooses B: Do you choose A or B if the current period is the final period (in other words the experiment does not proceed)? If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues (heads) and the first mover chooses A, earnings will depend on the answer to the first question. If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment ends (tails) and the first mover chooses A, earnings will depend on the answer to the second question. If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues (heads) and the first mover chooses B, earnings will depend on the answer to the third question.
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment ends (tails) and the first mover chooses B, earnings will depend on the answer to the fourth question.
A.3 Stability of strategies
We briefly analyze the stability over time of the distribution of strategies. In all treatments, the frequencies of strategies do not change considerably across periods. If we test, in each treatment, for equality of distributions between the first three periods we find no significant differences (p > 0.570). This finding tells us that the relative influence of reputation building and strong reciprocity vary little with repetition. 29 Next, we check whether this relative stability is hiding substantial changes at the individual level.
In order to analyze the stability of strategies within each subject, we take a look at how often subjects choose the same strategy. Specifically, we calculate the probability that a second mover picks in period t the same strategy that she picked in period t−1. Overall, second movers pick the same strategy for consecutive periods 64% of the time in Tilburg, 72% in Northwestern High, and 86% in Northwestern Low. The stability of individual strategies can be seen in Table A2 where this probability is calculated separately for each strategy and treatment. From the table, one can see that the three main strategies (reputation building, strong reciprocity, and unconditional defection) are quite stable. A second mover who chooses one of these strategies has around an 80% chance of choosing the same strategy in the next period. In comparison, the strategies that fall within 'other' are considerably less robust. In most cases, these strategies are chosen for only one period at a time. 30 With respect to the motivation of second movers to switch strategies, besides choosing a strategy under 'other', we do not find that either the previously chosen strategy or the outcome in the previous period has a significant effect. 31 In summary, strategies are fairly stable both across periods and within subjects. A majority of subjects consistently chose one of the strategies in Table 1 , while other strategies are chosen less consistently.
A.4 Control treatments
To ensure that the use of the contingent response method does not result in different behavior than the direct response method, we use this subsection to compare behavior in Tilburg and the two control treatments. Figure A1 gives an overview of the distribution of realized outcomes in the three treatments.
It is clear that outcomes are highly similar. This is corroborated if we test for equality of distributions across the three treatments (p = 0.992). 32
Next, we compare Tilburg with Control I to determine whether the elicited stage-game strategies change when they are conditioned on whether it is the last period or not. One could 30 Using binomial probability tests and the null hypothesis that the probability of choosing the same strategy in period t and t − 1 is less than 50% (i.e. a subject is more likely to switch than to choose the same strategy), we can (weakly) reject it in all treatments for reputation building (p < 0.001), unconditional defection (p < 0.001), and strong reciprocity (p < 0.056). For unconditional cooperation it is rejected in Northwestern High (p = 0.032).
Treating strategies under 'other' as a group, we cannot reject the null in any treatment (p > 0.998). 31 We ran a probit regression with a binary variable indicating whether a subject changes strategy from period t to t + 1 as the dependent variable. We used the following independent variables: dummy variables for the strategy chosen in t, dummy variables for the realized outcome in t, treatment indicator variables, and the period number.
We find that choosing a strategy from 'other' in period t is associated with a 32% higher probability of choosing a different strategy in t + 1 (p = 0.001, using White's heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator to cluster on each subject). However, we find no other significant effect. We get the same result if we run a separate regression for each strategy or for each treatment. worry that conditioning on the final period might trigger more strategic thinking than otherwise, and therefore, if contingent responses are elicited, there could be less conditional cooperation in the last period. However, we do not find this to be the case. As is shown in the top part of Table A3 , the frequencies of stage-game strategies for both treatments for non-final and final periods are very similar (distributions are not significantly different: p = 0.642 for non-final periods and p = 0.581 for final periods). Furthermore, in Control I we do not see a higher frequency of conditional cooperation in final periods. 33
Lastly, we compare cooperation rates between Control II and the other two treatments to test whether second movers' choices are affected by conditioning them on the first movers' action.
The actual cooperation rates in Control II and the ones implied by the strategies in the other treatments are seen in the bottom part of Table A3 . We do not find statistically significant differences between the frequencies of the three treatments when running tests that compare separately non-final periods and final periods depending on whether the first mover cooperates 33 There are no significant differences if we compare separately the frequency of each stage-game strategy across treatments (p > 0.268). or defects (p > 0.428). This also holds if we do pairwise tests between treatments (p = 0.202).
Thus, we conclude that, for our purpose, the contingent response or strategy method is a valid technique since it does not induce different behavior compared to 'hot' decision-making.
